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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it presents a model examining the
school choice processes of disadvantaged households accessing the LFP sector in a study on
Lucknow District, Uttar Pradesh. The model presents households in the study as engaging in
‘active choice’. Active choice is seen as the deliberated action of households in making
concerted choices about their children’s schooling through a complex process. The process
involved assessing competing school sectors (mainly the state and LFP), and analyzing
particular household circumstances and local school markets through a systemic set of
values, beliefs, and “mental models” (North, 1990) about education. Second, it focuses on
the adept employment of engagement strategies specific to the LFP sector by households in
the study to interact with their chosen schools. Since the schooling arena is heavily
marketised, household behavior was expected to follow Hirschman’s (1970) classic “exit,
voice, and loyalty” framework. However, contextual specificities of the LFP sector
necessitated a re-examination of this framework when applied here.
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SETTING THE SCENE
Reported deterioration in the quality of public schooling in many economically
developing countries has resulted in increased private provision (De, Majumdar,
Noronha & Samson, 2002; Glick & Sahn, 2006; Tooley & Dixon, 2005). Especially
striking is that increasing marketisation and privatization are not limited to changes in
schooling provision for middle or elite classes, but in an increasing number of countries,
are leading to the emergence of private schools for lower income groups (e.g. Alderman,
Orazem & Paterno, 2000; Bangay, 2005; Tooley & Dixon, forthcoming; Rose, 2005). The
mushrooming of what have been termed here, ‘low-fee private’ (LFP) schools in India for
socially and economically disadvantaged groups is one such phenomenon. Its significance
as a private sector targeted to a clientele with traditionally low participation in schooling
is crucial in understanding the changing schooling choices of a group that has been
marginalized in dominant educational research.
This study takes its cue from Stromquist’s (1999) call for in-depth analyses of
how schooling decisions are made within households, since it is the primary site affecting
educational access. While the heterogeneity of private schooling in India has been noted
(Aggarwal, 2000; De et al., 2002; Majumdar & Vaidyanathan, 1995; Tilak & Sudarshan,
2001; Tooley & Dixon, 2005), there is a dearth of research on the household schooling
behaviors of disadvantaged groups who access the LFP sector. Balagopalan (2004)
stresses that underpinning Indian educational discourse are the middle classes’ ideological
constructions of disadvantaged communities favoring child labor over schooling. Such
rhetoric portrays these groups either as “vulnerable” and likely to be “duped” by LFP
schools (Singh, 1995), or as “irresponsible” (e.g. Banerji, 2003; Government of India,
2002, p. 86). From this perspective, disadvantaged groups are characterized as
disinterested in schooling, ignorant of its benefits and, when faced with limited resources,
unwilling to send their children to school.

3

Within this context, the purpose of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it presents a
model examining the school choice processes of disadvantaged households accessing the
LFP sector in a study on Lucknow District, Uttar Pradesh. The model presents
households in the study as engaging in ‘active choice’. Active choice is seen as the
deliberated action of households in making concerted choices about their children’s
schooling through a complex process. The process involved assessing competing school
sectors (mainly the state and LFP), and analyzing particular household circumstances and
local school markets through a systemic set of values, beliefs, and “mental models” (North,
1990) about education.
Secondly, it focuses on the adept employment of engagement strategies specific
to the LFP sector by households in the study to interact with their chosen schools. Since
the schooling arena is heavily marketised, household behavior was expected to follow
Hirschman’s (1970) classic “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework. However, contextual
specificities of the LFP sector necessitated a re-examination of this framework when
applied here.
Following a presentation of the research strategy, the paper reframes the context
for LFP school choice in India, presents the school choice model for households in the
study, and outlines the engagement strategies they used to interact with chosen LFP
schools.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Uttar Pradesh is classed as one of the most “educationally backward” states in
India, with a literacy rate of 57.4%, placing it 31st of 35 states and territories
(Government of India, 2001). At the same time, it is estimated to have the second
highest distribution of private school enrolments in elementary education in the country
at 57.6% (Panchamukhi & Mehrotra, 2005, p. 236). Despite its reported pervasiveness
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(Aggarwal, 2000; De et al., 2002; Majumdar & Vaidyanathan, 1995; Tooley & Dixon,
2005), the new private sector accessed by disadvantaged groups has neither been
officially defined by the state nor operationally defined by researchers.
For the purposes of this study, the LFP sector was defined as occupying a part
(often unrecognized) of the highly heterogeneous private unaided sector1. LFP schools
were further defined as those that: saw themselves targeting disadvantaged groups, were
entirely self-financing through tuition fees, and charged a monthly tuition fee not
exceeding about one day’s earnings of a daily wage laborer at the primary and junior
(elementary) levels, and about two days’ earnings at the high school and intermediate
(secondary) levels.
Data collection roughly spanned one school-year, and was conducted from July
2002 to April 2003. Household-level results presented here are part of a larger
household, school, and state level case study on LFP schooling in Lucknow District
(Srivastava, 2005; 2006). The specific methods for data collection and sources of
evidence at the household level are presented below.

Focus Schools
One urban and one rural focus school was chosen from the 10 case study schools
(five urban and five rural) for more concentrated ethnographic-style study. Focus schools
were chosen on the basis that they were deemed to be the best competitors of each
group; having secured the largest enrolments and facing direct competition from multiple
LFP and state schools in their immediate vicinity. At the household level, the rationale
was that focus schools would provide a pool of household interviewees who could best
articulate their decisions about private schooling, perceptions of their chosen school, and
why that school was chosen over competing ones.

5

Interviews
Household
Data presented here were collected through semi-structured interviews with 60
parents (or close family members where appropriate), 30 each from the two focus LFP
schools. Household interviews were conducted by the researcher in Hindi on school
premises in a private area, and lasted 30-45 minutes. The interview schedule comprised
questions on: household socio-economic background, family composition, and
educational profiles; factors influencing choice and decision-making processes regarding
private schooling; perceptions about chosen schools; and the level of schoolresponsiveness and voice at the school. Questions on household and educational profiles
were structured, which allowed the collection of quantitative data about participants.
These data were used to better contextualize interviewees’ responses as a group and
identify schooling patterns within it.
School
The 10 formal school interviews informing results at the household level were
the second of three sets of interviews with each school. The interviews of interest here
addressed schools’ assessments of the educational needs of their target group, strategies
for responsiveness, and parental participation (school strategies; perceptions of
involvement). They were conducted in Hindi by the researcher on school premises and
averaged at 60 minutes.
Numerous informal interviews were conducted throughout the 10-month period
with owners/principals to reduce the “artificiality” of formal interview settings
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 140). They provided the opportunity to follow-up on
observation events or formal interviews over time, and in an atmosphere where
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owners/principals were more comfortable in giving details on privileged or sensitive
information (e.g. school income), or as a forum to elaborate on their thoughts.

Non-Participant Observation
Data on household engagement strategies were further collected through school
observations of parent-owner/principal interactions over the 10-month period.
Observations for this purpose were primarily conducted at focus schools in the
principal’s office during the break between shifts in the urban school, and near the end of
the school day at the rural school. These were the times when and “social places”
(Simpson & Tuson, 1995, p. 23) where parents most commonly approached schools.

School Documents
Student records and documents on information dissemination to parents were
analyzed. These included attendance and enrolment records, letters or notices to parents,
and school diaries.

REFRAMING SCHOOL CHOICE FOR THE INDIAN CONTEXT

There is a need to contextualize school markets (Waslander & Thrupp, 1997),
and frame the overall institutional parameters within which choice is operating in India.
Firstly, unlike the USA or UK, school choice as a “policy that is designed to reduce the
constraints that current school configurations place on schools and students”
(Goldhaber, 1999, p. 16), is not applicable. This is because the system of catchments
dictating public school allocation does not exist in principle, however, it may be that
most parents who send their children to state schools do so based on distance.
According to most State and Central Government regulations, most government schools

7

are not to deny admission to any child who wishes to be enrolled.2 Therefore, in
principle, parents have a choice of which school to access.
Secondly, similar to the USA and UK where privileged parents have had the
freedom to choose private schooling for their children (Ball, 2003; Gewirtz, Ball, &
Bowe, 1995; Golhaber, 1999; Power, Edwards, Whitty, & Wigfall, 2003), the same has
long existed for the upper middle class and elite in India. However, the use of private
schooling by parents from lower middle-class and disadvantaged groups marks the need
to examine changing school choice behaviors. The change seems to be linked, at least
partly, to an increase in the heterogeneity of private schooling provision by fee level
(Srivastava, 2006; Tilak & Sudarshan, 2001). Thus, new analyses on disadvantaged
households’ schooling behaviors should focus on choices between the public and private
sectors among this group.
Finally, increased choice for disadvantaged groups does not come from voucher
programs as in some countries (e.g. Chile) or the alleviation of catchment rules in others
(e.g. USA or UK), but from increased private provision. As Carnoy (2000) notes: “When
choice is about privatization, we need to know much more about how such an
educational system would look” (p. 15). In effect, school choice in the current Indian
context must be analyzed through a distinction of different choice systems.
The distinction between what Tooley (1997) describes as “choices”, the system
where parental choice exists within heavy state regulations, funding, and school
provision; or “choicem”, choice between competing suppliers, with an opening of the
supply-side reducing state monopoly in supply and funding, can be useful here.
According to results of this study, even though LFP schools (like other private unaided
schools), were heavily regulated in principle and should have activated the system of
choices, in practice, it was enacted through choicem even for disadvantaged groups. That
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is, LFP school choice is operating within a rapidly expanding array of private schools that
are independent of state funding and management, and operate through their own
informal set of rules and operational mechanisms (see Srivastava, 2007). However,
current understandings of school choice in India have not yet incorporated this changing
context.

Mind the Gap: Current Understandings of School Choice
Much of the literature on school choice has been developed in economically
advantaged countries (e.g. Belfield & Levin, 2005; Fusarelli, 2003; Gewirtz et al., 1995;
Power et al., 2003; Waslander & Thrupp, 1997). This makes it difficult to analyze the
private school choices of traditionally excluded groups in economically developing
countries. Apart from studies on voucher programs (Gauri & Vawda, 2004; McEwan &
Carnoy, 2000; Mizala & Romaguera, 2000) less relevant to public/private sector school
choice in the absence of government programs or private subsidies, literature on school
choice in economically developing countries is limited (e.g. Alderman et al., 2001;
Glewwe & Jacoby, 1994; Glick & Sahn, 2006), particularly in the private sector.
The majority of existing literature on private schooling in economically
developing countries examines the public-private mix of provision and delivery (Jimenez,
Lockheed, & Wattanawaha, 1988; Jimenez, Lockheed, Luna, & Paqueo, 1989; James,
1993; James, King, & Suryadi, 1996), comparative achievement (Cox & Jimenez, 1991;
Jimenez, Lockheed, & Paqueo, 1991; Kingdon, 1996), or educational expenditure and
financing (Ebel, 1991; Bray, 1996; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997). More recently, some
studies in the Indian context have contemplated the possibility of the private sector
meeting increased educational demand in view of Education for All goals (De et. al, 2002;
Mehrotra et al., 2005; Tilak & Sudarshan, 2001). However, a serious engagement with the

9

concept of ‘school choice’ is lacking in the academic discourse of economically
developing countries.
In its starkest form, choice in the context of individualism and liberal market
reforms is based on an extension of the concept of homo economicus, conceiving of the
parent as a rational thinking individual operating in an ‘open’ education system for selfinterest. In their critique, David, Davies, Edwards, Reay, and Standing (1997) outline that
choice, from this perspective, can be thought to involve various rational stages which are
applied to the selection of a school:
(1) possibilities are identified and separated out as ‘different’ and distinctive
from one another;
(2) information is acquired about each different option so that they can be
evaluated one against another, and against previously held criteria; and
(3) this rational appraisal leads to the selection of one option as the ‘choice’ (p.
399).

Of course, choice is a much more complicated process. Studies in the USA and
the UK have examined complications in choice-making arising from issues such as
incomplete information (e.g. Schneider & Buckley, 2002; Schneider, Teske & Marschall,
2000); confounding race and class factors (e.g. Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedescleaux, 1999;
Gewirtz et al., 1995; Tedin & Weihr, 2004; Wells & Serna, 1996); and different political
contexts and choice programs (Belfield & Levin, 2005; Fusarelli, 2003; Whitty, Power, &
Halpin, 1998). However, the current analytic on household decision-making processes
and schooling choices of disadvantaged parents in economically developing countries
lacks serious engagement of these and other potentially relevant issues.
For instance, a much cited study on school choice in Ghana (Glewwe & Jacoby,
1994) showed that higher quality schools (regarding certain school characteristics) were
attractive to parents. The researchers reported that repairing leaking classrooms
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produced the greatest increase in test scores, but investments in school libraries or
reducing travel time by building more schools yielded only modest increases. They
explained this seemingly contra-intuitive result by stating that: “If parents choose schools
based on their attributes, then these attributes are endogenous in an educational
production function; any positive choice association between school quality and
cognitive skills…may simply be due to the fact that more motivated students go to better
schools” (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1994, p. 844). However, as Lloyd, Mensch and Clark (2000)
astutely note, such analyses ignore “…those aspects of schooling that are most conducive
to encouraging initial enrolment and retention” (p. 113).
Households in this study chose LFP schools partly on their assessments of what
constituted ‘good schools’ on indicators which were sometimes contrary to accepted
educational research. For example, large class sizes in LFP schools were often cited as an
indicator of good schooling because, to these households, they indicated school
popularity. Household participants interpreted this as a sign that schooling must be
‘good’, which encouraged both initial enrolment and retention in a particular LFP school.
Thus, it could be that in the Ghanaian case above, fixing a leaky roof had more impact
on achievement not (only) because more motivated students went to better schools, but
because it motivated greater retention or enrolment by targeting a measure of quality in
that school type that parents perceived to be important. Such examples may point to the
endogenous nature of school choice, not only in achievement, but in initial enrolment
and retention related to perceived quality.
In Alderman et al.’s (2001) study on public/private schooling choices of lowincome households in Pakistan, 37 percent of children were enrolled in private schools
among families in the lowest income bracket (less than Rs. 2000/month) surveyed in
Lahore. Of all children in that income bracket, a slightly higher proportion of girls was
enrolled in private schools (37 percent) compared to boys (35 percent). They contend
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that schooling choices of poor parents are affected by fee level, school proximity, and
quality. However, Alderman et al. do not examine the process households followed to
arrive at this contra-intuitive finding, or how parents interacted with their chosen school
to maintain or later change that choice. Similarly, in their study on Madagascar, Glick &
Sahn (2006) find that school choice was related to quality and negatively to multi-grade
teaching and poor facilities, but there is no analysis on household choice processes.
Although such studies provide a useful starting point for outlining potential
factors influencing resulting school choices, they fall short of analyzing the processes
through which schooling decisions are made within households, and further, how
households interact with their chosen schools once the choice is made. The analysis here
aims to fill that gap from a different starting point.
Apple (2004) reminds us that the focus on school choice should be more
comprehensive to include “a systemic quality, a set of values, skills, dispositions, and
propensities that enables certain groups to employ educational reforms for their own and
individual collective benefit” (p. 396). Approaching the analysis of disadvantaged groups
and their engagement with private schooling in this manner allows one to ask the
question: ‘Is there a systemic set specific to disadvantaged groups in India allowing them
to employ LFP schooling for their individual and collective benefit, and if so how does it
work?’ The engagement of disadvantaged groups with the newly emerging LFP sector
underscores the need to examine results in this study from such a perspective, and to
ascertain whether, like middle-class parents in the UK or socially advantaged groups in
the USA, they too are able to extract some benefit. It necessarily enables the conception
of disadvantaged groups accessing the LFP sector as potentially active agents in their
children’s schooling rather than as passive bystanders.
Households in this study chose LFP focus schools through ideological constructs
related to their “mental models” discussed at length elsewhere (Srivastava, 2006). North
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(1990) defines mental models as the “pre-existing mental constructs through which they
[actors] understand the environment and solve the problems they confront” (p. 20),
which are essential to choice-making behavior. The mental models of parents in this
study were tied to their beliefs and values about education, perceptions of the different
school sectors accessible to them, aspirations for their children’s futures, and economic
concerns.
Their choice processes were also related to the particular socio-economic
positions that participating households occupied in relation to local school markets.
Households in the study viewed the schooling arena as highly marketised, one where
every social group “has its place”, and saw the LFP sector targeted to them (Srivastava,
2007). Though deeply considered and systematic, results indicate that their school choice
process was not ordered or linear and, very often, the resulting choice of school was not
seen as the ‘best’ or a permanent choice, but a workable proposition at that moment in
time. An in-depth examination of the school choice processes of participating
households follows a brief presentation of their profiles.

HOUSEHOLD PROFILES
Profiles of households in the study are presented in Table 1 in an attempt to
understand where they placed in relation to different forms of (dis)advantage: caste,
income, occupation, and education level. The majority of households fell under at least
one (but generally multiple) forms of (dis)advantage, as well as within the focus schools’
intended target group.

[Table 1 here]
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The majority (88%) of the 181 school-aged children in participating households were
sent to focus and other LFP schools. The remaining school-aged children went to state
(8%) and religious (1%) schools, while 3% were out of school. The most popular choice
for households in the study was LFP focus schools, which is undoubtedly related to the
fact that all interviewees were from the focus schools themselves. However, what was
surprising was the extent to which focus schools were accessed.
Given their limited financial resources and low educational status, the assumption
was that households in the study would be selective and access the private sector for one
child (probably male) (e.g. De et al., 2002; PROBE, 1999; Tilak & Sudarshan, 2001).
However, these households chose LFP focus schools for almost all (83%) of their
school-aged children; urban households sending 2.35 and rural households sending 2.6
school-aged children to their respective focus school. Furthermore (and surprisingly),
they were just as likely to send their daughters to LFP schools as their sons (see
Srivastava, 2006 for gender analysis). These findings were not intended to be generalized
but to contextualize LFP school choice for households in the study. Given that this was
one of the first studies expressly examining LFP school choice processes of
disadvantaged groups in India, the results above provide a contra-intuitive context from
which to examine the school choice processes of households in the study.

TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF LFP SCHOOL CHOICE
Data indicated that there were prerequisites for school choice, or certain
necessary conditions that had to exist for households in the study to make the initial
choice to send their children to school at all. These are discussed at length elsewhere
(Srivastava, 2006) but can be broadly categorized as: (a) infrastructure (mixed school pool
of school types and safe access to school) and (b) prioritizing education (ability to
prioritize and mental model shifts). The choice between available sectors and the choice
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of a particular LFP school were intertwined with them. In effect, the prerequisites
pointed to systemic barriers that may have traditionally blocked disadvantaged
households from accessing schooling (e.g. Karlekar, 2000).
To reiterate, the resulting model presents households in the study with mental
models favoring the LFP sector through a systemic set of values, beliefs, and perceptions
about education, the nature of provision in the two main sectors accessible to them (state
and LFP), aspirations for their children, and economic concerns. Choosing LFP schools
was particularly significant given households’ very limited finances, low education levels,
and relative inexperience with formal schooling. Results indicated that households
engaged in a dynamic and inter-related process structured by the macro-level attitudinal
factors, ‘perceptions about state and private sectors’ and ‘beliefs about education and LFP
schooling’, and the micro-level contextual factors, ‘information about local school
characteristics’ and ‘constraints’ (see Figure 1). For participants, choosing the LFP sector
was a multi-faceted process—choosing LFP focus schools was not the automatic result
of choosing between available state and LFP schools.

[Figure 1 here]

Having made the prerequisite choice to send their children to school, there were
two inter-related levels of choice for the purposes of the study: (1) a macro-level choice
of school type: the choice between different sectors (most commonly, state and LFP)
and (2) a micro-level choice of specific school: the choice between competing schools in
local school markets. While there seemed to be some correlation between the two levels
(beyond the scope of the study to ascertain), choosing one sector over the other at a
macro-level did not necessarily exclude selecting a school from the other sector, given
micro-level assessments of local school markets or constraints. For example, while a
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minority, 13 households simultaneously accessed LFP schools and state, religious, or no
schools for some of their school-aged children. In effect, the macro-level almost acted as
an umbrella through which households took stock of their specific situations, contexts,
and needs. The discussion on engagement strategies further below will show that they did
not view resulting choices as final and re-evaluated them within a school year.

Macro-Level Attitudinal Factors
Perceptions about the State and Private Sectors
Participants held firm macro-level perceptions about state and private sectors,
which were applied to their local contexts in choosing a school. Similar to other studies
(Govinda, 2002; Jeffrey, Jeffrey, & Jeffrey, 2005; PROBE, 1999), households generally
viewed both sectors as binary opposites, with all private schooling types offering a better
quality (however defined) of schooling. One rural father stressed:
The difference between here [the private sector] and there [the state sector]
is like that between the ground and the sky. –Ram Dev3

Similar to Ram Dev, many parents asserted that there was “something”
inherently different about private sectors that the state sector simply could not match.
This somewhat intangible set of qualities was a combination of parents sensing a more
conducive climate for schooling and more educational activities in private schools.
Interviewees perceived differences between the state and private sectors as deficiencies in
the former. They perceived these deficiencies mostly due to the general discourse on
schooling in their local communities, and in some cases, through personal experience of
both sectors.
Deficiencies in the state sector were attributed to a number of school-related
factors, such as: lack of adequate school facilities; short-staffing of teachers; unsanctioned
school closures and irregular school staff attendance; inadequate or infrequent
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monitoring or school inspections; lack of strict disciplinary procedures for children; an
unsupportive and non-responsive school environment for parents; and unreliable
teachers and unsatisfactory teaching practices. There is converging evidence in existing
literature on many of these points (e.g. Balagopalan & Subrahamanian, 2003; Jabbi &
Rajyalaskshmi. 2000; Nambissan & Sedwal, 2001; PROBE, 1999).
Household perceptions about differences between the state and LFP sectors were
most deeply ascribed to the attitudes and work practices of teachers, which were largely
conceived as negligent and dubious. Many viewed state teachers and their teaching
practices with disdain. In more extreme cases, some households expressed a heightened
lack of confidence in the state sector, dismissing it as being gravely malfunctioning and
rampant of corruption. Among this group, parents (and LFP owners) made allegations
that state inspectors did not make regular inspections or accepted ghoos (bribes) to pass
malfunctioning schools (similar to findings by Tooley & Dixon, 2005). Nonetheless,
teachers were blamed as the main culprits, seen as manipulating the state sector by
resorting to questionable practices such as transferring from remote postings for
personal motives:
There’s nothing but deceit and disloyalty in state schools. People sit at home
and accumulate their pensions. They don’t want to teach.
[…]
Teachers get their postings transferred locally [from rural schools]. They do their
household chores… farming and agriculture or business, they do everything.
They have no interest in teaching. So two or four children from the local area
go just to hang out, they’re not the studying type…what difference does it
make? Instead of playing at home they go and play at school.
And here in the city, what’s the situation in the state schools?
…I’ve never seen them. Nor do I have any power to go and visit them. […]
I think that it’ll be approximately the same type of environment here as well.
–Alok Kumar, Urban Father
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Such perceptions about the state sector were deep-rooted and, as for Alok
Kumar, held even if they were not validated in local contexts. In contrast, the LFP sector
was generally perceived as being efficient and successful in delivering a satisfactory
standard of schooling, mainly because for many, fee charging was seen as a prerequisite
for ‘good’ schooling.
Generally, perceptions about the LFP sector were: better school facilities; strict
adherence to school calendars and daily timetables; higher class of clientele; higher levels
of school responsiveness to specific needs; interested and capable teachers; an
environment more conducive to learning; better quality of schooling; and effective
school management. Positive perceptions about the LFP sector were related to a feeling
that there was some guarantee on the quality of schooling delivered, simply because
households paid a fee (no matter how low) which contributed to the school’s very
existence. Some parents felt that paying a fee gave them a right to test the claims made by
their chosen LFP school, contrary to the state sector.
Households also felt that children attending LFP schools were brighter. For
many, this perception was an extension of the belief that private schools were inherently
better than state schools. For others, it was due to differences in their children’s results
on various tasks and exams. However, it must be stressed that these perceptions were
based on school-devised exams or tests and not on comparable or standardized
measures. Some parents also felt that judging their children’s progress was difficult
because of their own limited or lack of schooling, Nonetheless, the perception held, and
the majority of households conceptualized LFP schools as the only viable tools for social
mobility, and the most tangible opportunity for a better life:
…I said that it’s been two years since they’ve been studying at the state
school and they’re not learning anything and their life is being ruined. Big deal
if they’re going [to school], they’re not learning anything… […]
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It’s the third year now that they’re at the private [focus] school. And now
however they do, they’re going to continue studying in private school. At
least they’ll learn something, they’ll be able to make something of their life.
–Champa Devi, Urban Mother

Beliefs about Education and LFP Schooling
The second attitudinal factor concerned households’ general beliefs about the
necessity of formal education and its role in their children’s futures. Most households felt
that traditional trades were no longer sustainable, requiring their children to seek formal
education for employment in different sectors (see Srivastava, 2006). These beliefs were
most expressly attached to the LFP sector, where parents perceived the type of education
required in India’s changing socio-economic context was available. This was despite their
lack of knowledge about the curriculum, and despite LFP schools in the study rigidly
following the same curriculum delivered in state schools. Nonetheless, LFP schooling
was seen as an essential commodity to acquire a place in the new labor market.
However, they felt that although education (LFP schooling in particular) was
necessary, it would not guarantee a job. Some attributed that to fate, while others felt that
nepotism or institutionalized corruption stood in the way:
There’s no guarantee at all [that they’ll find a job]… even those who’ve
passed intermediate [grade 12] roam around empty-handed. But having
been educated they can start their own business or trade. It’s common
practice to give a Rs. 150,000 bribe to get a job somewhere… even as a bank
manager or teacher. —Brij Bihari, Rural Father

Some households felt that the benefits of education were curbed after a certain
level (junior or high school). For them, the decision to send their children to secondary
or post-secondary education was pre-empted from the outset, in favor of setting up small
trades. Similar to Jeffrey et al’s (2005) account of privatization in Uttar Pradesh, this subgroup of households saw the LFP sector as a commodity, but accessed it for a specific
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purpose: to educate their children to an adequate standard in the 3 R’s so that they may
be self-sufficient in the future.
Beliefs about LFP schooling contributing to self-sufficiency were stressed by
parents who claimed that their own lack of education underscored the importance of
schooling their children. They specifically conceptualized LFP schooling as promoting
self-sufficiency and raising their children’s economic socio-economic status, as well as
negotiating barriers in everyday life and fostering independence, particularly for their
daughters. Similar to other studies (e.g. Jeffrey, 2005; Page, 2005), while many parents
acknowledged that girls’ education was important for employability, the changing
‘marriage market’ held relatively more importance (Srivastava, 2006). However, parents
believed that accessing the LFP sector for their daughters would increase social mobility
by receiving better marriage proposals. In some households, the need for girls’ education
was contested and choosing the LFP sector was the result of continuous advocacy.
Both macro-level factors were applied to households’ specific contexts and were
mediated by the micro-level contextual factors, ‘local school characteristics’ and
‘constraints’, to choose local LFP focus schools.

Micro-Level Contextual Factors
Information about Local School Characteristics
Since there was an adequately sized pool of potentially accessible state and LFP
schools for rural and urban households to choose from4, focus schools were not chosen
by default. Household choice processes partly relied on gathering information about
potential schools on different characteristics, such as: fee structure, fee management
practices, teachers’ attendance rate, school facilities, school environment, children’s
results, and medium of instruction. They gathered this information to make a judgment
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on the relative quality of different local schools according to their own indicators and
mental models.
Their primary and overwhelming sources of information were other parents in
the neighborhood or village, family members, and close friends who were considered
trustworthy and reasonably informed. The information was largely comprised of their
sources’ experiences of and general perceptions about focus schools compared with
other local schools. Except for a small minority of households that visited focus schools
prior to enrolling their children, or who had some direct knowledge by having previously
accessed it, most gained something similar to “hot knowledge” (Ball, 2003) by speaking
to other parents.
Surprisingly, even though the context and socio-economic status of households
in this study were vastly different to middle-class parents in England, they seemed to
engage in similar behavior of “chattering” about schools (Ball, 2003). Data indicate that
these disadvantaged households engaged in dynamic conversation about local schools,
actively sought information about them, and called on each other for ‘insider’ knowledge.
Once the information was collected, it was matched against similar information about
other local state and LFP schools and linked back to attitudinal factors. In light of the
information, they conducted a sort of cost-benefit analysis on the perceived quality of
local schools. For example, even though state schools had the lowest tuition fees and
despite their incentives (free textbooks, 3 kg wheat per month/child, and scholarships),
households did not feel that these benefits outweighed the costs of what was thought to
be an inferior quality of schooling.
Generally, the level of ‘goodness’ of different school types was perceived to
increase as fee levels and English instruction increased. For example, Hindi-medium LFP
schools were perceived to be better than state schools, medium-fee English private
schools better than Hindi-medium LFP schools, and high-fee English private schools
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were perceived as the best. Nonetheless, most households felt that given their budget and
available information on the quality of different schools (according to their conceptions
of ‘good’ schooling), focus schools were the best ‘value for money’. Most chose LFP
focus schools not because they were perceived as the ‘best’ overall choice, but because
they were the most workable and accessible to households in the study.
Generally, household conceptions of what constituted a ‘good school’ and ‘good
schooling’ at the macro-level held for the micro-level. The relative ‘goodness’ of focus
schools was related to certain household-articulated indicators, such as: school popularity
indicated by large class sizes and high instances of enrolment from local families;
children’s views on their degree of happiness; the practice of fee-charging; English
instruction (as a subject even if not English-medium); high promotion rates; good pass
rates on school tests and Board exams; regular teachers’ attendance; teachers paying
attention to children in class; strict discipline practices; and local parents’ opinions.
Valuing large class sizes may partially explain why the urban focus school’s
reputation grew as a ‘good school’ despite the fact that until 2001, when the school’s
facilities were extended, average class sizes were 60-70 in cramped conditions. In fact, the
owner explained that increased revenues due to jumps in enrolment and increased
popularity during this time enabled expansion. In the urban focus school’s experience,
stifling conditions and large class sizes prompted even more parents to access it.
High promotion rates were also an important consideration, since households
reported that they were the only check they had on the schooling delivered. However,
other than students who took board exams, all other assessment was school-based and
there were no external criterion-based assessments that could confirm students’
performance. Nonetheless, households did not question whether high promotion rates
resulted from student mastery of key concepts or lenient grading criteria. In fact, some
case study schools stated that they adopted lenient promotion policies since lower
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promotion rates would indicate low learning levels, which would be interpreted by
current and potential clients as low quality, and adversely affect popularity. Participants
also stressed that focus schools had certain specific characteristics (see Table 2),
prompting them to be chosen over competing LFP schools.

[Table 2 here]

Constraints
Unsurprisingly, practical constraints affected households’ choice of school. While
financial constraints may have been the most acute and pervasive, there were others (see
Table 3). Nonetheless, given their limited financial resources, parents explained that this
was the primary constraint and often a determining factor in deciding which local school
to access. Households reported that they tried finding a local school that matched as
many desired school characteristics as possible within their limited budget.

[Table 3 here]

Most of the 13 households that simultaneously accessed focus schools in
combination with others claimed it was because of financial constraints. In such cases,
some households opted for state schools based on the presumed aptitude of their
children. Others, particularly Muslim families, chose lower fee religious schools
(madrasas). Nonetheless, for most households, focus schools represented a viable option
with many desirable school characteristics, while allowing them to manage their
constraints. While most parents were satisfied having chosen focus schools, some were
concerned that a combination of constraints conspired, restricting their choice to the
focus school from some ‘ideal’ school. For them, even though certain desirable
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characteristics were not present in focus schools to the degree that they would have
ideally liked, the combination of individual constraints outweighed that concern. As
previously mentioned, a common example was choosing focus schools over medium-fee
English-medium private schools.
Thus, having been guided by macro-level attitudinal factors to favor the LFP
sector households applied them to their specific contexts through micro-level contextual
factors, and chose the focus schools for most of their children. However, as the
following discussion on engagement strategies will demonstrate, this choice was
continually re-evaluated, and for many, did not represent a final or permanent choice.

HOUSEHOLD ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES: DO EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY APPLY?
The increased commodification of schooling in India (Jeffrey et al., 2005) and
LFP sector choice in particular necessitates an analysis of patterns of interaction with a
consumer orientation. Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty provide a
starting point for thinking about how the introduction of market forces in schooling
provision for disadvantaged groups can alter their engagement with the schooling arena.
Although the concepts were developed to explain customer or member responses to
declining firms or organizations, Hirschman explicitly intended them to be applied to
other contexts and frequently used public/private education as an example to illustrate
client behavior. Therefore, it is surprising that while the concepts are frequently referred
to as generally accepted patterns of behavior regarding school choice, relatively few
studies (e.g. Adler & Raab, 1988; Moore, 1990; Willms & Echols, 1992; Matland, 1995;
Gordon, 1996) as a proportion of the vast school choice literature have actually used
them as explicit bases of analysis.
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According to Hirschman (1970), customers or members are likely to use one of
two options in response to a decline in the quality of a firm’s product or an
organization’s service:
(1) Some customers stop buying the firm’s products or some members leave
the organization: this is the exit option. As a result, revenues drop,
membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and
means to correct whatever faults have led to exit.
(2) The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their
dissatisfaction directly to the management…through general protest
addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the voice option. As a result,
management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible
cures of customers’ and members’ dissatisfaction (emphasis in original)
(p.4).

The important distinction is that exit is an economic mechanism and voice, a
political one. This distinction has been blurred in some studies that equate exiting to
choice (e.g. Ball, 2003, p. 40). In fact, many studies on school choice operationalize
‘choosers’ as those that have exited their local public school, requested special
placements, or participated in voucher programs (e.g. Adler & Raab, 1988; Stevans &
Sessions, 2002; Willms & Echols, 1992). The problem with such conceptualizations is
that the political mechanism of voice assumes secondary treatment, and parents who stay
at their local schools are depicted as ‘non-choosers’ or disinterested without an analysis
of their reasons for staying at a school. There is little indication whether these parents
indeed made the choice to stay at a particular school because they were actively engaging
with voice to make positive changes in it, expressing loyalty, or were what Hirschman
describes as “inert clients” who are less quality sensitive.
Loyalty assumes importance in such a discussion. According to Hirschman’s
(1970) framework: “As a rule…loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice” (p. 28). He
notes that loyalty is most important for organizations that occupy the bottom tier of a
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quality spectrum which is densely populated by similar competing organizations. In such
a scenario, loyalty can act as a barrier for a number of clients that are likely to exit to a
competitor. This seems particularly applicable to LFP schools which are abundant, in
fierce competition with one another, and which, in comparative terms, are generally seen
as lower quality than other schools in the private sector. However, data from this study
show that schools maintained their client base not by inculcating “loyalty and cohesive
ideology” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 82), but by actively targeting parents’ financial needs as
expressed through the engagement strategies they employed. Results indicated that
parents in this study neither used voice to engage with their LFP school politically nor
expressed loyalty, but that their immediate concern was to engage economically.
Resulting engagement strategies were quite different from Hirschman’s accepted
model. Households used four strategies as part of a spectrum to engage with the LFP
sector: staying, fee-bargaining, exiting, and fee-jumping depicted in Figure 2. Each strategy
indicates varying degrees of decreasing nesting at a particular LFP school, where nesting
refers to the likelihood of staying at a particular school for a significant length of time. In
light of the analysis, this was set at a minimum of beyond one school year.

[Figure 2 here]

Unlike Hirschman’s model, while households exited LFP schools they were only
somewhat quality sensitive to even their own indicators above. Strategies with greater
degrees of nesting (such as staying) were not related to the “political mechanism of
voice” or to loyalty expressed as a commitment to stay. In fact, voice was neither
employed nor sought in the traditional sense, and the concept of loyalty inculcating
converging ideologies, was non-existent. As the discussion will show, households
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established engagement strategies around the “economic mechanism of exit” to an even
greater degree than in Hirschman’s analysis.

Staying
The strategy with the highest degree of nesting was termed, staying. It was
employed by parents who accessed focus schools for at least one year, or who envisioned
their children to continue at their chosen school in the immediate future. Although it had
the highest degree of nesting compared to the other strategies, staying did not indicate a
final choice. For example, it did not preclude the option of exiting if children’s results did
not match desired outcomes, even in cases where focus schools were accessed for a
number of years.
Households expressed a number of rationales behind staying, which are
presented in Table 4. While much of the rationale was related to positive assessments of
schools, there were certain instances where it seemed less the result of positive factors.

[Table 4 here]

Staying was sometimes the result of obligation to LFP school owners because of
personal relationships, or out of a tradition to access certain schools. This feeling of
obligation was stronger in the rural case. For example:
…I mean, you send them here [to the rural focus school] and the children that
studied here and failed high school are the ones teaching. So when they
themselves don’t have any knowledge, then how are they going to teach?
That’s why we can see that our children can’t even speak proper Hindi. But
because it’s not good to keep changing schools… that’s why we’re sending
them to school here. –Nandu Ram, rural father
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Nandu Ram’s comment, “it’s not good to keep changing schools”, was in
reference to the perceived strain in his relationship with the owner if he exited. While this
degree of obligation was reported by only one interviewee, it seemed an important
theoretical distinction as it points to the possibility that staying at a particular school may
not be automatically due to quality satisfaction. This is contrary to Hirschman’s model
and traditional market analyses that continually accessing a school is prompted by loyalty
or voice, or indicates satisfaction (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1990; Tooley, 2000). The sense of
personal obligation is not akin to the concept of loyalty in Hirschman’s model, as it
carries a sense of coercion or unwillingness rather than a commitment to the school.
Data indicate that the strategy to stay may partly have been the result of certain
barriers: (1) exhaustion of the local school pool (more acute in rural group); (2) sense of
obligation to owners; and (3) the belief (though uncommon) that disruption from
moving children between schools was undesirable. Fundamentally, the analysis highlights
that staying relied on a mix of rationales and was not necessarily related to quality
satisfaction, pointing to the apparent unsuitability of homo economicus in this context.

Fee-Bargaining
It was not uncommon for parents to bargain over the amount of tuition fees due.
The interaction was not unlike the common practice of bargaining employed by Indian
consumers for any good in the market. According to observed practice in case study
schools, parents approached the owner/principal and claimed that they could not afford
the fees due because of other financial commitments or a lack of earnings. Instead, they
presented an amount they could afford, and after some haggling, made a final offer. This
offer was slightly higher than the initial amount but always less than the amount due.
Nonetheless, owners/principals accepted it, claiming they had no other choice.
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Households employed fee-bargaining with the intention of staying, but
threatened to exit if the reduced fee amount was not accepted. LFP school
owners/principals explained that they conceded to parents’ fee-bargaining instead of
expelling students for two main reasons: (1) philanthropic motive: claiming it was unfair
to deny their students schooling on account of their parents’ actions even if they felt
parents could afford the full amount and (2) profit motive: pressure to retain clients since
they could easily exit to competing LFP schools.
Superficially, fee-bargaining can be seen as a sort of voicing strategy. However, it
has quite a different nature. Voice, in the traditional model, implies that parents take
action to voice their concerns with the aim of improving school quality for the
educational benefit of their children. However, fee-bargaining was only used to voice
financial concerns with the aim of reducing financial commitments. This constitutes a
fundamental difference between the conceptualization of voice in Hirschman’s model as
a recuperation mechanism for quality improvement, and here, where it was only used for
improving crude efficiency. Moving further along the spectrum towards lower degrees of
nesting makes it clearer that Hirschman’s model was not applicable here.

Exiting
Households frequently and uninhibitedly employed the strategy to exit LFP
schools. What is seen as an extreme strategy in traditional school choice literature was
reportedly used by nearly all participants at some time. Enabling exit was the ease of exit
and entry in the LFP sector because of the specific operational arrangements that case
study schools (like other LFP schools) made (Srivastava, 2007). More tangibly, the
schooling pattern of the household in the following example is indicative of the
frequency and ease with which exiting was employed.
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In the span of three years, one urban household accessed three LFP schools: first
a rural LFP school, then an LFP school in another part of the city, and finally the urban
focus school. The family did not wait for the end of an academic year to exit a school. In
fact, the exits corresponded to their relocation plans rather than the school schedule.
They did not encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in any LFP school, even for
mid-year enrolments, despite the fact that this was against official enrolment procedures.
The majority of households reported that focus schools were not the first or only
schools they had accessed. In fact, although the focus school choice had a higher a
degree of permanence for most households than previous schools, the decision to exit
them was not improbable. For example, one household accessed the urban focus school
for all of its six children for eight consecutive years. Yet, the option to exit it were they
not satisfied with their children’s grades that year was mentioned as the next immediate
step. Conversely, households who had previously exited other LFP schools for the focus
schools expressed similar reasons. Apart from ‘chronic exiters’ who employed fee-jumping
(below), in which the prime and perhaps only concern was to access LFP schools
without paying, there was a mix of rationales for households who employed exiting (see
Table 5). Once again, exiting was not purely a quality sensitive decision as in Hirschman’s
model.

[Table 5 here]

Fee-Jumping
LFP clients displaying an extreme lack of likelihood to nest employed the feejumping strategy and were termed ‘chronic exiters’. All LFP owners/principals reported
that clients frequently exited their schools at the end of a given school year without
paying a large proportion of fees due. They claimed that parents “jumped on the fees” at
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their school, enrolling their children in another LFP school. According to
owners/principals, a certain degree of premeditation was central to this strategy. They
felt that chronic extiers would have determined from the outset to pay fees for only a few
initial months and exit at the end of the year. This would be repeated at another LFP
school the following year.
The success of this strategy hinged on the admission practices of most LFP
schools that were contrary to the official rules of admission. The proper course of new
enrolments was for the new student to submit a valid school record or ‘transfer
certificate’. However, in practice, many LFP schools admitted students without it.
Owners/principals asserted that it was advantageous for the admitting LFP school to do
so. Not only would the school’s enrolment increase, it would also collect admission fees
(usually double or triple the monthly tuition fee) and at least a few months’ fees. The
advantage for chronic exiters was that they saved the overdue amount at the old school
and on the cost of a full year’s fees at the new school. While fee-jumping was the most
extreme strategy in the spectrum, owners/principals claimed it was not uncommon.
Owners/principals stressed their powerlessness in dealing with chronic exiters as
they did not have much bargaining power because: (1) the threat of withholding transfer
certificates in non-board examined years was futile, having little or no effect on
admissions to other LFP schools and (2) expelling students was disadvantageous since
they hoped to recover some fees as long as parents stayed. It is clear that concepts of
loyalty and voice were non-existent in fee-jumping, and that it was used not as a quality
recuperation mechanism, but for financial gain.

Factors Contributing to the Success of Engagement Strategies
The success of household engagement strategies, particularly those with low
degrees of nesting, lay with the specific nature of the schooling market for disadvantaged
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groups and its operational arrangements. Firstly, the mushrooming of LFP schools in
urban and rural areas (although fewer in number) changed the landscape of school choice
for households that were mainly relegated to one sector—the state. The widespread
emergence of LFP schools provided disadvantaged households with a viable alternative
to the perceived (and perhaps actual) deterioration of quality in the state sector for the
first time. This landmark development allowed them to actively engage in school choice
by employing strategies that they felt would benefit their interests.
Secondly, in addition to the increased number and types of accessible schools, the
LFP sector’s specific operational arrangements (see Srivastava, 2005; 2007) allowed
households to employ these strategies uninhibitedly, and with little immediate cost to
their children’s education. For example, if the formal rule for admitting schools requiring
transfer certificates was not over-ridden by shadow rules allowing admissions without
them, then households could not employ fee-jumping or exiting with much success.
Exiting would not result in immediate entry to another school, having a negative cost to
their children’s schooling, and possibly acting as a deterrent for chronic exiters.
Finally, while some parents felt that moving children between schools could
adversely impact their schooling, this was not a barrier for most, even those employing
the strategy to stay. This facilitated the use of engagement strategies with lower degrees
of nesting, and partly seemed related to households’ lack of engagement with loyalty or
voice in the LFP sector.

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
It can be said that active school choice behavior is expected in a group that
directly invested in schooling and chose the LFP sector. However, the results challenge
traditional assumptions about the schooling choices and behaviors of disadvantaged
households in India and nuance the discourse. The complexities of the school choice
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processes and the resulting model in this study point to a systemic set of values, beliefs,
and mental models which guided these disadvantaged households in enacting their
school choices and engaging with their chosen schools. Results show that despite their
relative lack of familiarity with formal schooling, disadvantaged households in the study
made a deliberate and considered choice, albeit from a different frame of reference.
Furthermore, they did not assume the role of “disconnected choosers” (Gewirtz et al.,
1995), which would be the expected class-related typology most closely capturing the
group in this study. Disconnected choosers are defined as parents who:
…are disconnected from the market in the sense that they are not inclined to
engage with it. It is not that these parents have no views about education, or
no concerns about schools and their children’s achievement. They do, but
they do not see their children’s enjoyment of school or their educational
success as being facilitated in any way by a consumerist approach to school
choice (Gewirtz et al., 1995, p. 45).

Households in this study were in fact convinced that their children’s schooling
could be improved only through active engagement with the school market and a
consumerist approach to school choice, rather than relying on state provision. In fact, the
very nature of the school market facilitated the emergence of an approach to school
choice more consumerist than many economically developed countries. However, the
process was structured through ideological mental models, where any one of the
attitudinal or contextual factors informed the others and could result in reassessing the
choice. This poses a challenge to rational assumptions about school choice in exactly the
scenario they are assumed to operate—an exceedingly privatized and marketised school
arena.
A picture of households considering the choice through ideological or valuebased constructs and perceptions that can be influenced by peers and changing socioeconomic factors, school popularity and reputation, beliefs about education, aspirations
for children’s futures, and value-laden perceptions of a failing state sector, emerges.
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Furthermore, the fee-bargaining and fee-jumping strategies specific to the LFP sector
(and not other private sectors in India), highlights that the specificities of the contextual
make-up of particular schooling markets must be considered. Simply implanting client
strategies developed in other markets is insufficient for an adequate analysis, since
resulting client strategies to engage with chosen schools are themselves contextually
derived.
Finally, while traditional arguments for greater choice through marketisation
(resulting from affordable privatization or not) hinge on raising the public sector’s
efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 2003; Tooley, 1997; 2000),
they do not take into consideration systems where the public sector has no incentive to
compete. Hirschman’s theory was catalyzed by his observations of the Nigerian railway
system, which experienced large exit but did not have the mechanism’s desired
recuperation effect. This was because its revenue sources were diverse and relied more
heavily on state contributions than private ones. This is strikingly similar to Indian public
education, which in recent years has received increased funding from international
sources through Education for All programs without contingencies on quality
improvement. Therefore, while the emergence of the LFP sector heralds an important
and perhaps even desirable change for the schooling choices of some disadvantaged
groups, it also poses a paradox of further deteriorating quality for the public sector,
because:
While it is most clearly revealed in the private-public school case, one
characteristic is crucial…those customers who care most about the quality of
the product and who, therefore, are those who would be the most active,
reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also those who
are apparently likely to exit first in case of deterioration (Hirschman, 1970, p.
47).
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According to Hirschman’s typology, parents accessing the LFP sector would be
classified as the quality-conscious “alert clients” in relation to the competing state sector.
This has fundamental implications for the future of children whose parents either cannot
or do not access the LFP sector. For if the state sector is as malfunctioning as it is
perceived and documented to be, and there is cream-skimming of clients even among
disadvantaged groups, the future of schooling for the most disadvantaged does not seem
promising. From this perspective, while greater school choice through the LFP sector
seems desirable for disadvantaged groups who had little or no choice before, it may also
be highly iniquitous if it has no recuperation effect for the state sector.
Endnotes
Private unaided schools are financially independent of the state, and can be recognised or unrecognised.
This is in contrast to private-aided schools that are privately managed but heavily funded (up to 95 percent
of a school’s budget) through state grant-in-aid.
2 There may be some state variations. This does not hold for government schools run by central
departments for specific groups. For example, a small number of schools are run by the Department of
Tribal Welfare (for tribal groups), the Ministry of Defence (sainik schools), and Ministry of Social Justice
(for children with disabilities).
3 All names are pseudonyms. All interview excerpts are translated from the original in Hindi.
4 Rural households had a total of six schools (three state and three LFP) they could choose from. Due to
the large number of LFP schools in the vicinity of the focus school, the size of the urban school pool is
indeterminate. However, the urban focus school received direct competition from four other LFP schools
and two state schools on the same block.
1
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Table Error! Main Document Only.
Profiles of Households in the Study

Caste

55 percent belonged to Other Backward Caste or Scheduled Caste groups
(ranked as the lowest official caste groups in India)

Household Income

80 percent earned below the minimum annual taxable income of Rs. 50,000
Rural mean: Rs. 26,108 (excluding outlier)
Urban mean: Rs. 41,768

Parents’ Occupation

83 percent Mothers: Housewives (of those who worked all but 3 engaged in
domestic or manual labour)
84 percent Fathers: Manual labour, small farming, or low skilled jobs

Parents’ Educational Level

51 percent parents had no formal education or only some primary schooling
58 percent urban mothers and 53 percent rural mothers: no schooling

School-aged Children per
Urban households: 2.87
Household
Rural households: 3.06
Note: The sample was not intended to be representative. It constituted 10% of the total number of
households accessing LFP focus schools.
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Table 2
Specific Focus School Characteristics

Focus School Characteristic
Fee Concessions

Participant Articulations
Greater fee concessions making focus schools more affordable.

Flexible Fee Collection
Practices

More flexibility in the timing and amount of fees to be paid compared to
other LFP schools in area.

Convenience

Location of the school in the centre of the village or neighbourhood and
proximity to homes. The ability of children to go to school in groups without
adult escorts. This was seen as a factor addressing issues of safety for children,
parda for mothers in the village, and causing limited disruption to parents’
daily work schedules.

‘Home Grown’ School (rural
group only)

Personal connection with the school because unlike the other competing LFP
schools, it was owned and run by a villager.

Higher Status Clientele
(perceived)

Socio-economic status and educational awareness of parents at the focus
school thought to be higher than state schools. As there was no way for
households to check this comparatively, and as data indicate that there was
a large proportion of lower caste children at both schools, this is presented as
a perceived characteristic.
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Table 3
Constraints Affecting School Choice as LFP Focus Schools
Constraint
Financial

Participant Articulations
Household income inadequate to meet high schooling costs given low
income levels, family size, and competing needs

Location of School

Certain ‘ideal’ schools too far which would add to daily transport costs;
distance of school too great to be deemed as a safe choice for children to
navigate alone (more acute in rural group)

Personal Relationship with
Principal

A sense of obligation to choose a school because of personal relationships
with the principal and school management

Additional School Expenses

Too many ‘hidden’ costs of schooling: registration fees, exam fees, books
and school supplies, school activity fees, uniforms, private tuition all which
added increase financial input of schooling

Child’s Choice

Household compliance with child’s wish not to attend a particular school

Fee Amounts and Collection
Practices

Higher fees, fewer concessions, and inflexible fee collection practices at
‘ideal choice’
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Table 4
Set of Rationales behind Employing the Strategy to Stay
Rationale
Curricular

Explanation
•
Satisfied with children’s results
•
Housed all grades in the same school (KG through to grade 12)

Cost

•
•

Affordable fees
‘Flexi-fees’: flexible fee paying arrangements

Experience

•
•
•
•

Have had enough experience of the school to assess its claims of ‘good
schooling’
Believe that school earned its reputation
Feel obliged to stay because of long association
Do not wish to disrupt children’s schooling

School Management
Practices

•
•
•

High level of school responsiveness
Enforcement of school calendar and timings
Strict with children

Other School Related

•
•

Proximity
Satisfactory facilities

Household Related

•
•

Family tradition
Children wanted to continue attending
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Table 5
Rationales for Employing the Strategy to Exit
Rationale
Cost

Elaboration
•
Fees too high
•
Frequent demands for additional school activity fees
•
Perceive that quality of schooling is not comparable to fees charged (i.e.
not getting ‘value for money’)

Popularity

•
•

Notion that the school was not popular
Assumption that small class sizes indicated that the school was ‘not good’
because it was not bought into by many clients

Facilities

•

Inadequate school facilities

Curricular

•
•
•

Not satisfied with children’s results
Perception that not much schooling took place
Amount of English instruction

School Management
Practices & School
Administration Staff

•
•
•

Low level of school responsiveness
Lack of trust in the school management staff
Not much flexibility in fee payments

Household Related

•
•

Relocated from rural to urban areas or neighbourhoods within the city
Child did not want to attend

